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BANKRUPTCY-IS IT OVER EVEN THOUGH NO
ONE IS SINGING: DETERMINING FINALITY IN
BANKRUPTCY APPEALS-BULLARD V HYDE
PARK SA V BANK (IN RE BULLARD), 752 F.3D 483
(1ST CIR. 2014).
A bankruptcy court's ruling cannot be appealed until a final order
has been issued.' When a bankruptcy judge denies the confirmation of a
reorganization plan, but allows the debtor to propose a modified plan, it
becomes difficult to determine the order's finality. 2 In Bullard III, the
First Circuit considered whether an order denying confirmation of a
' See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012) (granting circuit courts' jurisdiction over appeals from all
final decisions, judgments, orders and decrees); see also Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain_ 503 U.S.
249, 251-52 (1992) (clarifying jurisdiction under § 158 in addition to, not in lieu of, normal
appellate jurisdiction); Lievsay v. W. Fin. Sav. Bank (In re Lievsay), 118 F.3d 661, 662 (9th Cir.
1997) ("If the underlying bankruptcy court decision is interlocutory, the [Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel] order affirming or reversing it is also interlocutory."); Flor v. BOT Fin. Corp. (In re Flor),
79 F.3d 281, 283 (2d Cir. 1996) (determining district court's order not final unless underlying
bankruptcy court's order final). Because of a bankruptcy proceeding's complexity, courts
constructed the flexible finality standard. See Perry v. First Citizens Fed. Credit Union (In re
Perry), 391 F.3d 282, 284-85 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding "final" meant all issues pertaining to
discrete dispute resolved); Fugazy Express, Inc. v. Fugazy Limosine Ltd. (In re Fugazy Express,
Inc.), 982 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir. 1992) (drawing distinction between discrete dispute and entire
bankruptcy proceeding); In re G.S.F. Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1473 (1st Cir. 1991) ("[B]ecause
bankruptcy cases typically involve numerous controversies bearing only a slight relationship to
each other 'finality' is given a flexible interpretation in bankruptcy."), abrogated on other
grounds by Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Gennain, 503 U.S. 249 (1992); see also Bowers v. Conn. Nat'l
Bank, 847 F.2d 1019, 1022 (2d Cir. 1988) (recognizing finality of bankruptcy court's decision
affected by district court's disposition of appeal). Prior to assessing an appeal's merits, a court
must determine the proper interpretation of finality. See In re St. Charles Pres. Investors, Ltd.,
916 F.2d 727, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (applying strict interpretation of final to avoid piecemeal
review and conserve judicial resources). But see In re G.S.F Corp., 938 F.2d at 1473
(interpreting finality flexibly in bankruptcy context).
2 See Bullard v. Hyde Park Sav. Bank (In re Bullard) (Bullard I11), 752 F.3d 483, 486 (1st
Cir. 2014) ("The finality of an order denying confirmation of a reorganization plan is the subject
of a circuit split."), cert. granted 135 S. Ct. 781 (2014); Gordon v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re
Gordon), 743 F.3d 720, 722 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding denial of confirmation of proposed plan not
final order when debtor may amend plan); Lindsey v. Pinnacle Nat'l Bank (In re Lindsey), 726
F.3d 857, 861 (6th Cir. 2013) (same); Zahn v. Fink (In re Zahn), 526 F.3d 1140, 1142-43 (8th
Cir. 2008) (same); In re Lievsay, 118 F.3d at 662-63 (same); In re Lopez, 116 F.3d 1191, 1194
(7th Cir. 1997) (same); Maiorino v. Branford Sav. Bank, 691 F.2d 89, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1982)
(same). But see Mort Ranta v. Gorman, 721 F.3d 241, 246 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding denial of
confirmation of proposed plan final order even though debtor may amend plan); In re Armstrong
World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 2005) (same); Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners
Ass'n (In re Bartee), 212 F.3d 277, 283-84 (5th Cir. 2000) (same).
3 752 F.3d 483 (1st Cir. 2014), cert. granted 135 S. Ct. 781 (2014).
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4
reorganization plan was final if the debtor could propose a modified plan.
The First Circuit held that if an intermediate appellate court affirms a
bankruptcy court's refusal to confirm a reorganization plan-and the debtor
can propose an amended plan-then, the order is not final and therefore not
immediately appealable .
In Bullard III, the case's facts were inconsequential because the
court focused on a jurisdictional question.6 Instead, the First Circuit
meticulously examined Bullard's procedural posture. 7 Although the First

4 See Bullard III, 752 F.3d at 486 (acknowledging court presented with rarely addressed

issue of law). Previously, in Watson, the First Circuit suggested that an order denying
confinnation of a reorganization plan may not be a final order, if the bankruptcy case was not
dismissed, and the debtor remained free to propose a modified plan. See Watson v. Boyajian (In
re Watson), 403 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2005) (insinuating court's position). The Watson court did not
decide whether the bankruptcy court's order was final because the parties agreed that the order
was not final. See id.(displaying court's reluctance to address jurisdictional question).
5 See Bullard III, 752 F.3d at 485 (reasoning denial of confirmation of proposed plan not
final order).
6 See id.("We start and, as it turns out, end with the jurisdictional question.").
The First
Circuit has avoided questions of statutory jurisdiction to reach a case's merits, but this was not
possible in Bullard III because the case presented an unsettled question of law. See id.at 489-90
(conceding option to avoid statutory jurisdiction unavailable); see also Alvardo v. Holder, 743
F.3d 271, 276 (1st Cir. 2014) (furthering Restoration Pres. Masonry standard to include
precedent must dictate results on merits); Restoration Pres. Masonry, Inc. v.Grove Eur. Ltd., 325
F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir. 2003) (ruling statutory jurisdiction questions avoided when merits inquiry
easily decided in challenging party's favor). In Bullard, the debtor's mortgage was underwater,
meaning the debtor owed more on the property than it was worth. In re Bullard (Bullard1), 475
B.R. 304, 305-06 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012). The debtor filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy and
attempted to reorganize his debentures. Id. (elaborating on creditor and debtor's relationship).
The case's underlying issue centered on the debtor's proposed plan and whether it conformed to
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) and 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)
(2012) (allowing debtor to modify rights of secured claim holder); 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (b)(5)
(codifying debtor's right to cure any arrearage and maintain payments).
7 See Bullard III, 752 F.3d at 484-85 (examining case's procedural posture in detail).
This
case began in Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court and garnered judicial attention because the debtor
proposed a "hybrid" plan. See Bullard 1, 475 B.R. at 307-14 (focusing analysis on debtor's
"hybrid" plan); see also Bullard III, 752 F.3d at 484-85 (awaiting opportunity to decide unsettled
question involving "hybrid" plan's legality). In Bullard I, the debtor attempted to bifurcate an
undersecured claim into secured and unsecured portions also known as cure and maintain and
then, extend payments on the secured portion beyond the statutorily mandated time frame
known as modifying the claim. BullardI,475 B.R. at 306-07 (explaining debtor's and creditor's
contentions). The creditor believed that the debtor could either cure and maintain or modify the
claim. See id.at 306 (emphasis added). Ultimately, the Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court ruled in
the creditor's favor and held that a plan which modifies and cures and maintains cannot be
confirmed. See id.at 314 (emphasis added) (proclaiming debtor's misguided reliance on
Bankruptcy Code). Importantly, the Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court ordered the debtor to file
an amended plan within thirty days or face dismissal. See id. After the Massachusetts
Bankruptcy Court's ruling, the debtor appealed to the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
of the First Circuit. See Bullard v. Hyde Park Say. Bank (In re Bullard) (BullardI1), 494 BR. 92,
94 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2013) (reviewing case on debtor's appeal); see also BullardIII, 752 F.3d at
484-85 ("[The debtor] [r]ecogniz[ed], though disagree[d] with [Bankruptcy Appellate Panel]
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Circuit initially questioned the appeal's validity on jurisdictional grounds,
the court ordered the parties to brief both the jurisdictional and merit
questions.8 The First Circuit dismissed the appellant's appeal and decided
that if a bankruptcy court refuses to confirm a reorganization plan, and the

debtor can submit an amended plan, then the order is not final and hence
not appealable as of right. 9
The Founding Fathers conceptualized a system of comprehensive
bankruptcy regulation to strengthen American commerce and foster
consistent insolvency proceedings.' 0
Congress overhauled federal
bankruptcy law with The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 ("The 1978

precedent holding that denial of confirmation of a reorganization plan is not a final order
appealable as of right .... "). The debtor also filed a motion for leave to appeal the bankruptcy
court's interlocutory order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), (b). BullardIII, 752 F.3d at 48485; see 28 U.S.C. §158(a)(3), (b) (granting Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's jurisdiction over
appeals of bankruptcy court's interlocutory orders). The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the First
Circuit granted the debtor's appeal. BullardII, 494 B.R. at 101. After reviewing the case's facts,
the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) held that the debtor could not both cure and maintain and
modify his debts. See id. (emphasis added) (ruling in creditor's favor while adopting different
reasoning than lower court). After the BAP's decision, the debtor appealed to the First Circuit.
See Bullard III, 752 F.3d at 484-85 (reviewing case on debtor's appeal). Subsequently, the First
Circuit asked the debtor (appellant) to explain why the case should not be dismissed if the BAP's
order affirming the denial of confirmation was not final. See id. (foreshadowing First Circuit's
concern with debtor's appeal).
8 See Bullard III, 752 F.3d at 485-86 (ordering parties to brief jurisdictional and merits
questions).
9 See id. at 489-90 (holding denial of confirmation of proposed plan not final order).
10 See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the UnitedStates, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 12-14 (1995) (developing history of American bankruptcy law); see also
Kristin D. Kiehn, Note, Jurisprudence and Jurisdiction: Toward a More Flexible Approach to
Bankruptcy InterlocutoryAppeals, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3261, 3261 (1999) ("Bankruptcy law
not only determines the rights of individual litigants ... but it regulates the commercial sector,
the operation of businesses, and the financial relationships between people."). Although
bankruptcy law received little attention at the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the Bankruptcy
Clause was codified into law before the convention's closing remarks. See Tabb, supra, at 13
(detailing Constitutional Convention's proceedings); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4
(permitting Congress to pass uniform laws on bankruptcy). In The Federalist,James Madison
opined about the importance of bankruptcy laws:
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with
the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their
property may lie or be removed into different States, that the expediency of it seems
not likely to be drawn into question.
THE FEDERALIST No.

42 (James Madison), availableat
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed 42.html. Despite the Founding Fathers' interest,
permanent federal bankruptcy law did not exist until 1898. See Tabb, supra, at 13-14 (tracking
progression of bankruptcy law). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1898 was substantially amended
in 1938 by the Chandler Act. See Tabb, supra, at 28-30 (explaining federal bankruptcy law's
evolution).
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Act")." The 1978 Act focused on establishing a unified jurisdictional
system and avoided addressing flaws in bankruptcy appellate procedure.12
Whereas The 1978 Act founded a unified jurisdictional system,
Congress drafted the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984 (The 1984 Act) to restructure bankruptcy appellate procedure. 3
The 1984 Act still primarily governs bankruptcy appeals. 14 Despite the

11See Tabb, supra note 10, at 32-33 (illustrating importance of The 1978 Act to federal
bankruptcy law's development). The 1978 Act was gradually phased in during a transition
period. See id.at 34 (elaborating on The 1978 Act's implementation); see also H.R. REP. No.
95-595, at 1 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5963 (codifying Congressional
amendments into bankruptcy law).
12 See Tabb, supra note 10, at 34-35 (listing problems Congress hoped to fix with The 1978
Act); see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5787
(revealing legislature's desire to create comprehensive federal bankruptcy law); James M.
Grippando, CircuitCourtReview of Orders on Stays Pending Bankruptcy Appeals to U.S. District
Courts or Appellate Panels, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 353, 354-56 (1988) (reviewing problems with
development of bankruptcy appellate procedure). The 1978 Act altered the status of bankruptcy
judges, improved the administration of bankruptcy cases, and merged sections of the Bankruptcy
Code. See Tabb, supra note 10, at 33-37 (specifying The 1978 Act's achievements). In Northern
Pipeline, the Supreme Court determined that The 1978 Act was unconstitutional. See N. Pipeline
Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (holding The 1978 Act
unconstitutional for exceeding Article III's scope); see also Kiehn, supra note 10, at 3261
(highlighting Northern Pipeline's importance). Therefore, Congress passed the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 ("The 1984 Act") to align the Bankruptcy Code
with the Northern Pipeline decision. See Tabb, supra note 10, at 38-39 (illustrating uncertainty
caused by Northern Pipeline decision); see also Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 and 28 U.S.C.) (restructuring
bankruptcy court system). Next, Congress passed The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 ("The
1994 Act"), which created a National Bankruptcy Review Commission that assessed and
reformed the Bankruptcy Code. See Tabb, supra note 10, at 42 (explaining importance of The
1994 Act); see also Act of October 22, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.) (amending Bankruptcy Code and creating second
National Bankruptcy Review Commission).
13 See Grippando, supra note 12, at 358-63 (reviewing problems with development of
bankruptcy appellate procedure); see also Maiorino v. Branford Say. Bank, 691 F.2d 89, 92 (2d
Cir. 1982) (dismissing The 1978 Act as "hastily drawn" and "jumble[d]"); Frank W. Volk,
Closing a Deep Divide: Appealing a Denial of Plan Confirmation, 32-NOV AM. BANKR. INST. J.
34, 34 (2013) (describing finality's elusiveness inbankruptcy context).
14 See Lindsey Freeman, Comment, BAPCPA and Bankruptcy DirectAppeals: The
Impact of
ProceduralUncertainty PredictablePrecedent, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 543, 550 (2011) (elaborating
on bankruptcy appellate procedure); see also Carlos J. Cuevas, Judicial Code Section 158: The
Final Order Doctrine, 18 Sw. U. L. REV. 1, 25-49 (1988) (displaying bankruptcy appellate
procedure's intricacies). Although district courts retain original jurisdiction over bankruptcy
proceedings, most jurisdictions automatically transfer bankruptcy matters to bankruptcy courts.
See Freeman, supra, at 550 (confirming bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters);
Katelyn Knight, Comment, Equitable Mootness in Bankruptcy Appeals, 49 SANTA CLARA L.
REV.253, 253-55 (2009) (illustrating bankruptcy court's jurisdictional right). When a proceeding
reaches bankruptcy court, a bankruptcy judge can rule on issues central to the bankruptcy
proceeding. See Freeman, supra, at 550-51 (distinguishing between "core" and ancillary issues);
see also DAVID G. KNIBB, FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS MANUAL § 14.1 (5th ed. 2007) (stating
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Bankruptcy Code's reformulations, judges and practitioners still trudge
through inconsistencies when handling a bankruptcy appeal.' 5
An appellate court encounters an unsettled issue of law when
determining an order's finality in a bankruptcy proceeding. 6 Appellate
courts disagree about the degree of finality needed for an appeal to proceed
on the merits, and their perplexing decisions highlight the Bankruptcy
Code's inadequacies. 7 The judiciary created the flexible finality doctrine
to provide clarity and consistency to bankruptcy appeals.' 8 Nonetheless,
bankruptcy judge's right to draft recommendations to district court for "noncore" issues).
Normally, a district court hears a bankruptcy case's initial appeal. See Freeman, supra, at 550-51
(outlining trajectory of bankruptcy case's appeal); see also 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012) (granting
district court's right to hear appeals from bankruptcy court's final judgments, orders, and
decrees). In certain jurisdictions, a BAP can hear the appeal instead of the district court. See
Freeman, supra, at 550-51 (revealing some jurisdictions established BAPs specifically to hear
bankruptcy appeals). Additionally, "with leave of the court," a district court can adjudicate
interlocutory orders and decrees. See § 158(a)(3) (permitting district courts right to hear
interlocutory appeals). After the district court's or BAP's decision, a federal court of appeals has
jurisdiction. See Freeman, supra, at 551 (tracking travel of bankruptcy appeals).
15 See Adam D. Cole, Comment, "It Ain't Over Till It's Over:" Interpreting 28 US.C. S
158(D) Finalityfor Bankruptcy Appeals to Circuit Courts, 53 ALB. L. REv. 889, 889-90 (1989)
(opining The 1984 Act failed to address fundamental issues with bankruptcy appellate
procedure); Freeman, supra note 14, at 546 (stating bankruptcy appellate procedure attempts to
balance practical considerations and constitutional values); see also John P. Hennigan, Jr.,
Toward Regularizing Appealability in Bankruptcy, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 583, 584-85 (1996)
(acknowledging fundamental problem with bankruptcy appeals stems from determining order's
finality); Sarah E. Vickers, Interlocutory Appeals in Bankruptcy Cases: The Conflict Between
Judicial Code Sections 158 and 1292, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 519, 519-20 (1991) (arguing problems
within bankruptcy appellate procedure evolves from structure itself); Joseph Mitzel, Note, When
is an Order Final?: A Result-OrientatedApproach to the Finality Requirement for Bankruptcy
Appeals to Federal Circuit Courts, 74 MINN. L. REv. 1337, 1337-39 (1990) (examining
fundamental problems with bankruptcy appellate procedure).
16 See Hennigan, supra note 15, at 583-84 (portraying vastly different applications of
finality
in federal and bankruptcy cases); Mitzel, supra note 15, at 1349-54 (recounting two philosophies
of finality adopted by federal courts); see also Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of
Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1354 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Appellate jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases is a
murky subject."); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
5.08 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer
eds.,16th ed. 2014) ("In the specific context of bankruptcy cases, the courts have had a difficult
time in determining what is a final order and what is an interlocutory order.").
17 See 28 U.S.C. § 158 (illustrating statutory foundation for bankruptcy appeals). Generally,
federal courts require finality before an appeal may be heard. See Hennigan, supra note 15, at
583-84 (explaining only final order appealable). On a direct appeal, a case can be heard without
any preceding determination of finality, but the Bankruptcy Code's management of direct appeals
has been criticized. See Freeman, supra note 14, at 546-47 (disagreeing with how Bankruptcy
Code handles direct appeals). Many courts have voiced their displeasure with the inefficient
structure governing bankruptcy appeals. See Maiorino, 691 F.2d at 92 (criticizing legislatures
attempt to create efficient bankruptcy appellate procedure); see also Kham & Nate 's Shoes No. 2,
Inc., 908 F.2d at 1354 (describing bankruptcy appellate landscape as "murky"); In re Gould &
Eberhardt Gear Mach. Corp., 852 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1988) (opining "final is a pregnant word"
in bankruptcy context) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1 See Bullard III, 752 F.3d 483, 485-86 (1st Cir. 2014) (adopting flexible interpretation of
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courts reach inconsistent rulings because they struggle to determine
whether the denial of an organization plan is a final order if the debtor can
still amend the plan. 19
finality), cert. granted 135 S. Ct. 781 (2014); Bourne v. Northwood Props., LLC (In re
Northwood Props., LLC), 509 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 2007) (acknowledging bankruptcy cases'
unique nature demands flexible application of finality); Watson v. Boyajian (In re Watson), 403
F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2005) (ruling appellate court proper venue if underlying bankruptcy court order
final); Perry v. First Citizens Fed. Credit Union (In re Perry), 391 F.3d 282, 285 (1st Cir. 2004)
(determining disposal of all issues within discrete dispute rendered case final in bankruptcy
context); In re G.S.F. Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1473 (1st Cir. 1991) ("B]ecause bankruptcy cases
typically involve numerous controversies bearing only a slight relationship to each other,
'finality' is given a flexible interpretation in bankruptcy."), abrogatedon other grounds by Conn.
Nat'l Bank v. Germain- 503 U.S. 249 (1992); In re Gould & Eberhardt Gear Mach. Corp., 852

F.2d at 29 (basing finality on practical judgment); see also In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc.,
432 F.3d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 2005) (codifying four factor test to determine finality). But see In re
St. Charles Pres. Investors, Ltd., 916 F.2d 727, 729-30 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (adopting practical
application of finality to avoid piecemeal litigation); Simons v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re
Simons), 908 F.2d 643, 644-45 (10th Cir. 1990) (interpreting finality for bankruptcy in traditional
not flexible terms). Courts further dissected the "finality" requirement and distinguished
ministerial and significant further proceedings. See In re Gould & Eberhardt GearMach. Corp.,

852 F.2d at 29 (differentiating between ministerial and further proceedings). Ministerial
proceedings involve minimal discretion whereas, significant further proceedings require courts to
make discretionary rulings. See Gordonv. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Gordon), 743 F.3d 720, 723
(10th Cir. 2014) (ruling order not final when significant further proceedings remained); In re
Gould & Eberhardt Gear Mach. Corp., 852 F.2d at 29 (reasoning ministerial proceedings leave
little discretion for court).
19 See Volk, supra note 13, at 34 (noting judiciary's struggle with determining finality of
denial of reorganization plan). Although most circuit courts have adopted the flexible finality
standard, courts have disagreed about how to apply this standard to the denial of a reorganization
plan. See Bullard III, 752 F.3d at 486 ("The finality of an order denying confirmation of a
reorganization plan is the subject of a circuit split."); see also In re Gordon, 743 F.3d at 722
(finding denial of confirmation of proposed plan not final order while debtor may amend plan);
Lindsey v. Pinnacle Nat'l Bank (In re Lindsey), 726 F.3d 857, 861 (6th Cir. 2013) (same); Zahn
v. Fink (In re Zahn), 526 F.3d 1140, 1142-43 (8th Cir. 2008) (same); Lievsay v. W. Fin. Say.
Bank (In re Lievsay), 118 F.3d 661, 662 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); In re Lopez, 116 F.3d 1191,
1194 (7th Cir. 1997) (same); Maiorino v. Branford Say. Bank, 691 F.2d 89, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1982)
(same). But see Mort Ranta v. Gorman 721 F.3d 241, 246 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding denial of
conformation of proposed plan not final order while debtor may amend plan); In re Armstrong
World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d at 511 (same); Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Ass'n (In re
Bartee), 212 F.3d 277, 283-84 (5th Cir. 2000) (same). The minority circuits stretch the flexible
finality standard and validate their rulings with discussions of practicality and judicial efficiency.
See Mort Ranta, 721 F.3d at 248 (agreeing with pragmatic approach adopted by minority
circuits); In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d at 511 (concluding denial of confinnation
final order due to practical considerations); In re Bartee, 212 F.3d at 283-84 (declaring practical
considerations compel adoption of minority circuit's approach). The majority circuits rigidly
interpret the flexible finality standard and focus their decisions on: (1) the difference between
ministerial and significant further proceedings; and (2) whether all issues pertaining to a discrete
dispute were finally dispensed. See BullardIII,752 F.3d at 486-87 (focusing analysis on disposal
of discrete dispute and bankruptcy court's responsibilities on remand); In re Gordon, 743 F.3d at
723 (fixating decision on difference between ministerial and significant further proceedings); In
re Lindsey, 726 F.3d at 859-61 (contrasting ministerial and significant further proceedings to
reach decision); In re Zahn, 526 F.3d at 1143 (centering analysis on whether lower court's
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In Bullard III, the First Circuit adopted the majority approach and
determined that the denial of confirmation of a proposed plan is not a final
order if the debtor can propose an amended plan.2 0 The Bullard III
decision was founded on a suggestion made in Watson and precedent
established by Perry and Gould & Eberhardt.2 1 Despite the debtorappellant's contentions, the First Circuit sided with the creditor-appellee's
position, and joined the majority circuits. 22 The Bullard III court reasoned

decision finally resolved discrete segment of proceeding); In re Lopez, 116 F.3 d at 1192 (relying
on distinction between ministerial remand and remand with significant further proceedings). But
see In re Lievsay, 118 F.3d at 662-63 (ruling denial of confirmation interlocutory therefore
jurisdiction not conferred to court by § 158(d)); Matorino, 691 F.2d at 89-90 (concluding denial
of confirmation interlocutory only and not appealable). The flexible finality standard promotes a
circuit split because this standard attempts to fix nuanced issues with a broad-brush stroke. See
Volk, supra note 13, at 35-36 (recognizing problems on both sides of circuit split).
20 See BullardIII, 752 F.3d at 486-489 (adopting majority's position); see also supra note 19
and accompanying text (explaining divergence between majority and minority circuits). The
Bullard III court did not thoroughly analyze any of its sister circuits' decisions, instead, it
acknowledged the circuit split's existence and utilized favorable cases to support its position. See
BullardIII, 752 F.3d at 486 (paying credence to sister circuits' decisions).
21 See Bullard III, 752 F.3d at 485-89 (basing decision on established and implicit
precedent); see also In re Watson, 403 F.3d at 4 (implying court believed denial of proposed plan
not final order if debtor could amend); In re Perry, 391 F.3d at 285 (establishing discrete dispute
framework for First Circuit); In re Gould & Eberhardt Gear Mach. Corp., 852 F.2d at 29
(drawing distinction between ministerial and significant proceedings). The Bullard III court
declined to dismiss the Watson court's suggestion. See BullardIII, 752 F.3d at 485-86 (refusing
to disregard Watson court's subliminal adoption). In Watson, the court did not expressly decide
the issue because both parties agreed that the order denying confirmation was not final. See In re
Watson, 403 F.3d at 4-5 (explaining why court avoided answering unsettled jurisdictional
question). Next, the Bullard III court established the framework for determining finality in a
bankruptcy proceeding with Perry and Gould & Eberhardt. See Bullard III, 752 F.3d at 486-87
(creating framework for analyzing finality in First Circuit). The BullardIII court read Perry to
establish that a bankruptcy court's order is final if it disposes of all issues within a discrete
dispute. See id. at 485-87 (reasoning flexibility does not require resolution of all issues in case);
see also In re Perry, 391 F.3d at 285 (forming First Circuit's understanding of finality in
bankruptcy context). Then, the Bullard III court used Gould & Eberhardt to emphasize the
difference between ministerial and significant further proceedings. See Bullard III, 752 F.3d at
486-87 (finding order final where remanded for ministerial proceedings but not for significant
further proceedings); see also In re Gould & Eberhardt Gear Mach. Corp., 852 F.2d at 29
(establishing First Circuit's framework for analyzing finality in bankruptcy context).
22 See Bullard III, 752 F.3d 487-89 (acknowledging positions of debtor and creditor, yet
refusing to overturn precedent). The appellant argued that a denial of a confirmation order is
presumptively final, unless the appellee proves otherwise. See id.at 486 (describing appellant's
proposed standard as rigid). The appellee suggested the court hold that an order denying
confirmation is not final if the debtor can propose an amended plan. See id.(urging court to join
majority of circuits). The Bullard III court stated that the appellant's position promoted judicial
inefficiency. See id.at 488-89 (concluding appellant's request would inevitably clog appellate
dockets with issues better decided elsewhere); see also Matorino, 691 F.2d at 91 ("Otherwise, at
every stage of the bankruptcy proceedings the parties will run to the court of appeals for higher
advice."). The appellant declared that if he could not appeal the denial of his plan, he would have
two options: (1) propose an unwanted plan, object to it, and appeal its confirmation; or (2) allow
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that because the debtor was allowed to propose an amended plan, the
bankruptcy court could still exercise significant discretion over the
proceeding and no discrete dispute within the proceeding had been
resolved.23 Hence, the bankruptcy court's decision was not final or
appealable.24
The circuit split exists because courts inconsistently apply the
flexible finality standard.25 The majority circuits focus their rulings on a

his petition to be dismissed and appeal the dismissal. See Bullard III, 752 F.3d at 487
(enumerating appellant's options). However, the court asserted that the appellant had other
options available which he did not peruse:
(1) he could have sought certification and
authorization to appeal the bankruptcy court's order to the First Circuit directly under 28 U.S.C. §
158(d); or (2) he could have taken his appeal to the district court, instead of the BAP, and
attempted to appeal the district court's interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). See id
(describing all options available to debtor in bankruptcy as laid out by Congress); see also 28
U.S.C. § 158(d) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012). Furthermore, the appellant alleged that
because his appeal presented a question of unsettled law, proposing an unwanted plan was
superfluous. See BullardIII, 752 F.3d at 487-88. Notwithstanding, the court determined that the
appellant's situation fit within the rigid parameters of 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i) not 28 U.S.C. §
158(d)(1) as the appellant contended. See id. at 488 (directing appellant to appropriate statute);
see also § 158(d)(2)(A) (allowing lower court to certify direct appeal when challenged order
implicates pure question of law); In re Lindsey, 726 F.3d at 860 ("Why certify such issues for
appeal if 'final' in § 158(d)(1) covers them anyway? And why add § 158(d)(2) to the Code in
2005 if § 158(d)(1) already did the work?"); MortRanta, 721 F.3d at 258 (Faber, J., dissenting)
("[T]his Court ... should not bend the judicially-crafted 'flexible finality' concept such that it
renders the multiple avenues for interlocutory appeals unnecessary.").
23 See BullardI1, 752 F.3d at 487-89 (founding decision on distinction between ministerial
and significant proceedings, while acknowledging effects on judicial efficiency). The Bullard III
court specified that its analysis may differ when the bankruptcy court confirmed a plan and the
BAP or district court reversed the ruling. See id.at 489 n.9 (limiting applicability of holding to
Bullard's facts). The Bullard III court distinguished the two fact sets, reasoning that when the
plan is denied and allowed to be amended, the court with jurisdiction over the remanded case has
significant discretion, whereas, when the bankruptcy court confirms the plan and the case is later
remanded, only ministerial tasks are left. See id.at 487-88 (adopting similar rational, but
applying different analytical framework).
24 See id.
at 490 (ruling in appellee's favor).
25 See id.
at 485-88 (applying rigid interpretation of flexible finality in bankruptcy context);
Gordon v. Bank of Am., N.A. (In re Gordon), 743 F.3d 720, 723 (10th Cir. 2014) (interpreting
flexible finality rigidly); In re Lindsey, 726 F.3d at 858-61 (structuring decision on strict reading
of flexible finality); Zahn v. Fink (In re Zahn), 526 F.3d 1140, 1142-43 (8th Cir. 2008)
(implementing rigid interpretation of flexible finality); In re Lopez, 116 F.3d 1191, 1191-94 (7th
Cir. 1997) (basing decision on strict translation of flexible finality). But see Mort Ranta, 721
F.3d at 245-50 (endorsing pragmatic reading of flexible finality); In re Armstrong World Indus.,
Inc., 432 F.3d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 2005) (adopting practical approach to assess finality); Bartee v.
Tara Colony Homeowners Ass'n (In re Bartee), 212 F.3d 277, 281-84 (5th Cir. 2000) (relaxing
flexible finality standard). Courts have grounded their decisions on other factors. See Lievsay v.
W. Fin. Say. Bank (In re Lievsay), 118 F.3d 661, 662 (9th Cir. 1997) (analyzing interplay
between § 158 and interlocutory orders); Maiorino, 691 F.2d at 89-90 (fixating on public policy
discussion). Scholars have opined on the circuit split because of the circuit courts' inconsistent
rulings. See Cuevas, supra note 14, at 31-35 (siding with majority because contrary decision
would contravene language of § 158(d)); Cole, supra note 15, at 891-92 (supporting majority's
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plain reading of § 158's language.26 The majority courts, with near
unanimity, plainly read § 158 and rigidly apply the flexible finality
standard, thereby forcing the courts to rule that an order denying a plan's
reorganization is not final if the debtor can amend the plan. 27 Dissenters
argue that the majority court's rulings are incomplete without considering
the Bankruptcy Code's comprehensive statutory framework and the
judiciary's limited resources. 2 8
Minority courts apply a lenient flexible finality standard and
supplement their decisions with discussions of public policy, judicial
efficiency, and statutory construction. 29 The majority and minority circuits
disagree about the most basic decision needed in appellate practice:
approach because of its consistency with traditional determinations of finality); see also Volk,
supra note 13, at 34-36 (pinpointing weaknesses in majority and minority decisions). But see
Mitzel, supra note 15, at 1337-39 (opining bankruptcy appellate inconsistencies exist because
Bankruptcy Code's language).
26 See Bullard III, 752 F.3d at 487-88 (directing discussion to statute's language);
In re
Gordon, 743 F.3d at 723 (spotlighting finality's meaning); In re Zahn, 526 F.3d at 1142-43
(honing opinion on interpretation of statute's language); see also Volk, supra note 13, at 35
(criticizing majority's strict textual approach). A strict textual analysis disregards why Congress
restructured bankruptcy appellate procedure. See H.R. CONE. REP. No. 98-882 (1984), reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 576, 601-04 (detailing Congress' attempt to provide consistency to
bankruptcy appellate proceedings); Volk, supra note 13, at 35 (discouraging courts from strict
textual approach).
27 See Bullard III, 752 F.3d at 486-89 (centering discussion on hardline reading of flexible
finality and reaching majority position); In re Gordon, 743 F.3d at 723 (focusing on rigid textual
analysis and reaching majority position); In re Zahn, 526 F.3d at 1142-43 (aiming opinion's
analysis on strict textual interpretation and reaching majority position).
28 See Hennigan, supra note 15, at 585 (acknowledging problem with bankruptcy procedure
stems from finality's construction); Vickers, supra note 15, at 519-20 (arguing statutory
framework creates problems within bankruptcy appellate practice); Volk, supra note 13, at 35
(illuminating important factors disregarded by strict textual analysis); Mitzel, supra note 15, at
1337-39 (expressing concern about bankruptcy appellate procedure). The Bankruptcy Code's
inconsistencies justify courts expanding their analysis beyond the statute's language. Cf In re
Lindsey, 726 F.3d at 860 (assessing multiple factors prior to reaching conclusion); In re
Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 432 F.3d at 511 (expanding inquiry to incorporate many factors);
In re Lopez, 116 F.3 d at 1191-94 (increasing number of factors considered in analysis).
29 See MortRanta, 721 F.3d at 245-50 (applying lenient interpretation of flexible finality and
focusing on public policy and judicial efficiency); In re Bartee, 212 F.3d at 282-84 (concentrating
on public policy concerns and loosely interpreting flexible finality). Minority and majority
circuits utilize the same statutory framework and reach markedly different conclusions. See
Bullard III, 752 F.3d at 487-88 (devoting portion of decision to interplay between § 158's
subsections, yet siding with majority); Mort Ranta, 721 F.3d at 248 (interpreting interplay
between Bankruptcy Code's sections and adopting minority approach); In re Bartee, 212 F.3d at
283 (analyzing how statutory framework awards appellants options, yet siding with minority); In
re Lievsay, 118 F.3d at 662-63 (inquiring about interaction between § 158 and interlocutory
orders, then adopting majority position). Many scholars and judges disagree with the minority
approach. See MortRanta, 721 F.3d at 255-63 (Faber, J.,
dissenting) (dissecting and disagreeing
with court's entire opinion); In re Lopez, 116 F.3d at 1192-94 (dismantling minority court's
position); Volk, supra note 12, at 35 (articulating belief minority approach flawed).
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determining whether the previous proceeding's order was final.3 0
If
bankruptcy appellate judges cannot consistently answer such a basic
question, then a fatal problem exists within the Bankruptcy Code. 3 '
Despite the Founding Fathers's desire to establish consistent
bankruptcy proceedings and the Bankruptcy Code's many reformulations,
litigants, attorneys, and judges still must question the Bankruptcy Code's
most rudimentary declarations.3 2 Bankruptcy appellate procedure provides
litigators with less predictability than its civil and criminal counterparts.33
Congress could reformulate bankruptcy appellate procedure without

30

See supra note 19 and accompanying text (illustrating discrepancies between circuits in

handling questions of finality); see also Hennigan, supra note 15, at 583-84 (emphasizing
determination of finality initial step in majority of bankruptcy proceedings). Courts focus on
determining the order's finality, yet considerations of public policy and legislative intent should
not be disregarded, because they are needed to understand the statute's purpose and intended
application. See Hennigan supra note 15, at 583-85 (clarifying importance of determining
finality); see also Bullard III, 752 F.3d at 487-89 (complementing finality analysis with brief
discussion of public policy); Mort Ranta, 721 F.3d at 245-50 (supplementing discussion of
finality with considerations of public policy and judicial efficiency). When analyzing the finality
of a denial of a confinnation plan, courts disregard pragmatic considerations and play legal
gymnastics, allowing minority and majority circuits to divaricate on issues of public policy and
judicial efficiency. See Bullard III, 752 F.3d at 487-89 (using public policy arguments to
substantiate majority's position); In re Lindsey, 726 F.3d at 861 (construing public policy as
consistent with majority position); In re Lopez, 116 F.3d at 1194 (employing public policy to
corroborate majority's position); Matorino, 691 F.2d at 91 (interpreting public policy
considerations as consistent with majority position). But see Mort Ranta, 721 F.3d at 247-49
(focusing court's discussion on considerations of public policy to justify minority's position); In
re Armstrong World Indus. Inc., 432 F.3d at 511 (formulating test with public policy
considerations and taking minority's position); In re Bartee, 212 F.3d at 282-83 (arguing public
policy considerations compatible with minority's analysis). The judiciary's focus on purely legal
issues limits the creation of lasting precedent and leaves lawyers, debtors, creditors, and lower
courts with their fingers crossed. Cf Volk, supra note 13, at 34-36 (denouncing appellate court's
handling of jurisdictional question surrounding denial of confirmation order).
31 See Hennigan
supra note 15, at 584-86 (recognizing confusion within bankruptcy
appellate practice); Vickers, supra note 15, at 519-22 (arguing inconsistencies exist within
Bankruptcy Code's framework); Mitzel, supra note 15, at 1337-39 (conveying belief bankruptcy
appellate procedure mired in confusion).
32 See Tabb, supra note 10, at 32-36 (illustrating Congress' attempted reformulations of
Bankruptcy Code); Kiehln supra note 10, at 3261 (detailing Constitutional Convention's
proceedings and recounting Founding Fathers's formulation); supra notes 18-19 and
accompanying text (highlighting judiciary's struggle determining finality of denial of
confirmation plan despite attempts to establish consistency).
33 See Hennigan supra note 15, at 583-84 (drawing distinctions between criminal, civil, and
bankruptcy appellate practice); Mitzel, supra note 15, at 1345-50 (presenting differences between
criminal, civil, and bankruptcy appellate practice). Much to the judiciary's dismay, it has been
forced to make decisions better left to Congress. Cf Maiorino, 691 F.2d at 92 (criticizing
bankruptcy appellate procedure); see also Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of
Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351, 1354 (7th Cir. 1990) (conveying displeasure with bankruptcy appellate
procedure); In re Gould & Eberhardt Gear Mach. Corp., 852 F.2d 26, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1988)
(opining bankruptcy appellate procedure riddled with inconsistencies).
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backlash.34 A thorough and final reformulation of bankruptcy appellate
procedure would provide debtors and creditors with consistency, an ideal
conceptualized at the Constitutional Convention.35
The Book of Deuteronomy stated "[a]t the end of every seven
years you must cancel debts .... Every creditor shall cancel any loan they
have made to a fellow Israelite. They shall not require payment from
anyone among their own people, because the LORD's time for canceling
debts has been proclaimed."3 6 Approximately twenty-seven centuries after
Mosaic Law established this principle, the United States' Bankruptcy Code
is still underdeveloped.
Congress has half-heartedly attempted to
restructure the Bankruptcy Code, and done even less to amend bankruptcy
appellate procedure.
Scholars, lawyers, litigants, and judges have
complained for over thirty years about the inconsistencies within
bankruptcy appellate practice, without efficient Congressional action. To
provide the consistent bankruptcy proceedings our Founding Fathers
dreamt of, Congress must amend the Bankruptcy Code and fix the flawed
system governing bankruptcy appeals.
Corey W. Silva

34 See Tabb, supra note 10, at 32-43 (detailing reformulation adopted between 1978 and
1994); Kiehn, supra note 10, at 3261-62 (outlining bankruptcy appellate procedure's
modernization); see also Volk, supra note 13, at 37 (calling for Congressional reform of
bankruptcy appellate procedure). The legal community would appreciate an efficient overhaul of
bankruptcy appellate procedure. See Maiorino, 691 F.2d at 92 (opining about bankruptcy
appellate procedure's weaknesses); see also Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc., 908 F.2d at 1354
(voicing concerns with bankruptcy appellate procedure); In re Gould & Eberhardt Gear Mach.
Corp., 852 F.2d at 28-29 (revealing unease with bankruptcy appellate procedure); Hennigan,
supra note 15, at 597-603 (criticizing bankruptcy appellate procedure's formulation); Vickers,
supra note 15, at 519-20 (denouncing bankruptcy appellate procedure); Volk, supra note 13, at 37
(opposing current bankruptcy appellate procedure); Mitzel, supra note 15, at 1337-39
(condemning bankruptcy appellate procedure).
35 See Tabb, supra note 10, at 32-43 (explaining Congress's history of unsuccessfully
reforming bankruptcy law); Kiehn, supra note 10, at 3261 (conveying Founding Fathers's desire
to establish thorough and consistent bankruptcy law); see also Volk, supra note 13, at 37
(envisioning comprehensive bankruptcy reform initiated by Congress).
36 Deuteronomy 15:1.

